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Comments
ERISA Preemption of Medical Malpractice Claims
Against Managed Care Organizations
The balance of power in the health care arena is shifting to
managed care organizations and away from individual physicians
and hospitals. Traditionally, courts applied tort theory to
compensate patients proving harm caused by the incompetent
practice of medicine. Plaintiffs seeking to sue managed care
organizations for medical malpractice are often finding today,
however, their claims are preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").'
EMERGENCE OF MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Due primarily to steadily increasing health care costs, managed
care organizations have proliferated.2 Additionally, enrollment in
managed care organizations has been continuously expanding. 3
Managed care organizations began to appear in the early 1970's,
covering approximately 3.6 million people. By 1995, almost 150
million Americans had enrolled in managed care organizations.4
Additionally, in 1997, almost 75% of people insured through their
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1985).
2. Laura H. Harshbarger, ERISA Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Tbward a
Comprehensive Social Policy, 47 SYRACUSE L REV. 191, 194 (1996). See also Phyllis C. Borzi,
Fiduciary Responsibility Issues under ERISA - 1996, Q245 ALI-ABA 133, 135 (June 6, 1996);
Edward S. Kornreich, Health Care M & A: Commercialization of the Medical Industry, 741
PLI'CoMM 329, 331 (Apr.-May 1996).
3. Harshbarger, supra note 2.
4. Robert A. Clifford, Physicians' Liability in a Managed Care Environment, 10(2)
THE HEATH LAWYER 5 (Oct. 1997).
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employers were enrolled in a managed care plan.5 The explosive
growth of managed care is evidenced by the fact that just two
years earlier, in 1995, managed care plans covered only 51% of
Americans.
6
As a result of the increasing enrollment in managed care
organizations, the health care market has consolidated
substantially.7 Health insurers, physicians, and hospitals, once
separate entities, are joining to form managed care organizations.
8
Physicians and hospitals are joining managed care organizations, in
part, out of fear of losing patients to the managed care plans.9 The
pace of change is likely to continue at a high rate.10
WHAT IS A MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATION?
A managed care organization is a "framework" for reducing and
restraining costs for the provision of health care." Costs are
controlled by providing care through alternative delivery systems
and other cost-restricting methods such as pre-admission
5. Consumers and Managed Care, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1997, at § 4, 1, available at
1997 WL 7984196.
6. Id.
7. John F Bales, MI, Medical Malpractice Developments, 700 P.LIjCoMAw 563, 645
(Sept.-Oct. 1994). See also Torin A. Dorros & T. Howard Stone, Implications of Negligent
Selection and Retention of Physicians in the Age of ERISA, 21 AM. J. L & MED. 383, 383-84
(1995).
8. Bales, supra note 7. A four stage process of market change for the health care
industry has been described as:
Four stages of market development:
(1) Stage One - Markets are unstructured fee for service, with independent
hospitals, physicians, employers, and HMOs.
(2) Stage Two - Markets are those where HMO enrollment has grown, putting
pressure of hospital rates and occupancy rates.
(3) Stage Three - Markets are characterized by consolidation across the
spectrum of insurers, providers, and purchasers, with capitation contracts
growing in importance.
(4) Stage Four - Markets are characterized by some direct contracting
between purchasers and integrated systems, and extensive capitation of
providers with the associated shifting of financial risks to physician groups and
PHOs.
Physician Rev. Commission, Ann. Rep. to Congress Part 11, The Changing American Health
System: Background and Overview, at 249-50 (1995).
9. Neil Chesanow, How Fast Can Things Change? Just Look at Philadelphia, 74(2)
MED. EcON. 42, 48-50 (Jan. 27, 1997).
10. David F Drake, Managed Care: A Product of Market Dynamics, 277(7) JAMA 560,
563 (Feb. 19, 1997).
11. Brian P. Battaglia, The Shift 7bward Managed Care and Emerging Liability
Claims Arising from Utilization Management and Financial Incentive Arrangements
Between Health Care Providers and Payers, 19 U. ARK LnrrLz ROCK W. 155, 156 (1997).
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certification, concurrent review, discharge planning, case
management, and utilization review.
2
A managed care plan combines financing (insurance) and health
care delivery.13 The following features characterize managed care
organizations:
(1) the organization delivering benefits assumes some or all
of the financial risk for furnishing those benefits;
(2) the benefits are restricted to those designated in the
contract;
(3) coverage is limited to services provided by a specified
group of providers (physicians);
(4) benefits and coverage are constrained by assorted
payment controls;
(5) network physicians typically must accept plan payments
as payments in full for medical care provided (in addition to
co-payments in some plans);
(6) benefits and coverage are subject to various utilization
procedures (including pre-certification and utilization review);
(7) physicians are employed either by, or under contract
with, the managed care organization;
(8) if plan enrollees receive treatment from a physician who
is not in the managed care organization, the plan will likely
not pay for the services. 14
A managed care plan is made up of "a series of interlocking and
overlapping legal relationships - primarily those between the
employer and the managed care organization ("MCO") and the MCO
and its providers."15 Several types of managed care plans exist,
12. Id. Alternative delivery systems provide health care in a setting other than from
one primary care physician. See Robert A. Blum, et. al., Basic Legal Issues for Employers in
Managed Care, C799 ALI-ABA 509, 513 (Mar. 24, 1993).
Pre-admission certification is the prospective review of coverage for treatment under the
plan before services are rendered. Concurrent review is the periodic review of the treatment
as it is being furnished to decide if the care should proceed. Borzi, supra note 2, at 147-48.
In case management and discharge planning programs, the managed care organization
decides what care will be provided to an enrollee and in what setting the care will be
provided. Harvey E. Pies, Quality Assurance and Risk Management in Managed Care: An
Overview of Important Legal Issues, C653 ALI-ABA 193, 229 (Sept. 1991).
Utilization review is the evaluation, using clinical criteria, "conducted by third-party
payors, purchasers, or health care organizers to evaluate the appropriateness of an episode,
or series of episodes, of medical care." Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321,
1323 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 812 (1992).
13. Borzi, supra note 2, at 135-36.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 136.
1998
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including the staff-model health maintenance organization ("HMO"),
group-model HMO, network-model HMO, independent practice
association ("IPA") HMO, preferred provider organization ("PPO"),
exclusive provider organization ("EPO"), managed indemnity plan,
and point-of-service Plan ("POS").16
Managed care organizations limit health care costs by reducing
the amount of care provided to the participants (fewer referrals to
specialists, tests, and procedures) and by implementing payment
schemes for physicians. 7 MCOs may reimburse physicians for their
services by fee-for-service, capitation, or financial incentive
arrangements. 18 Managed "fee-for-service" payment discounts the
physician's usual and customary payment.19 Payment by "capitation"
generally reimburses the physician each month with a specific
payment for each enrollee. 20 "Financial incentive arrangements" are
characterized by specific funds (risk pools) set aside for
disbursement at the end of each year, allocated using performance
goals or the physician's expenditure projections. Performance goals
may be set for hospital referrals, emergency room referrals,
consultative (specialist) services, tests and procedures, or quality
16. Physician Review Commission, supra note 8, at 190. The report listed the following
types of Managed Care Plans:
Staff-Model HMO: A plan that directly hires its physicians.
Group-Model HMO: A plan that contracts with a single physician group, usually on an
exclusive basis.
Network-Model HMO: A plan that contracts with several physician groups, usually on
a nonexclusive basis.
Independent Practice: A plan that contracts with Association (PA) HMO individual
physicians or physician groups, usually on a nonexclusive basis.
Preferred Provider A plan that contracts with Organization (PPO) individual
physicians for fee discounts, but which is usually not at risk.
Exclusive Provider A type of PPO in which enrollees Organization (EPO) are only
covered for services of network providers.
Managed Indemnity Plan: A plan that imposes some type of utilization review on the
care delivered by any provider. Providers do not have contracts with the plan.
Point-of-Service: A managed care product, (POS) Plan sometimes called an
open-ended HMO, in which the enrollee has the option of obtaining care from a
non-network provider at a higher out-of-pocket cost.
Id. See also Battaglia, supra note 11, at 186.
17. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical
Issues in Managed Care, 273(4) JAMA 330 (Jan. 25, 1995).
18. Battaglia, supra note 11, at 176-77.
19. Id.
20. Id. A "capitation agreement" requires a physician to provide care to a patient,
regardless of how many office visits are required. Consequently, the physician assumes the
financial risk. The physician risks having a set of patients who require more than the average
amount of care. Id.
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assurance pools.21
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND MANAGED CARE ORGANIZATIONS
Tort law "is a body of legal principles" which controls damaging
behavior, allocates responsibility for harms that arise in social
interaction, and provides compensation for those injured with valid
claims.22 Tort liability, which is premised upon a breach of a duty
owed by one party to another without regard to promises
(contracts), embraces both intentional and unintentional acts.23
Medical malpractice is a form of negligence, which is an
- unintentional tort.
24
In the past, plaintiffs, when suing for medical malpractice,
typically brought suit against the physician and/or the hospital.
With their explosive growth and methods of making medical care
decisions, managed care organizations have become the targets of
plaintiffs' medical malpractice claims.25 MCOs may be liable for
medical practice for their own actions, or corporate negligence. 26
They may also be liable for the malpractice of their physicians
under imputed or actual agency theories.
27
21. Id. See also Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, supra note 17.
22. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, TORT AND ACCIDENT LAw 1 (2d ed. 1989).
23. Id.
24. Id. The elements of a cause of action of negligence are: (1) duty (recognized by
law); (2) breach of duty; (3) actual (defendant's action or inaction actually caused the
plaintiff's harm) and proximate cause (recognized by law); and (4) damage (actual loss or
damage to the interests of the plaintiff). W. PAGE KEETON ET AL, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE
LAW OF TomS § 30, at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
The elements of a cause of action for medical malpractice have evolved to correspond to
those of a negligence action. To be successful, the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action
must establish: (1) that the physician owed her a legal duty; (2) that the physician breached
that duty by failing to conform to an acceptable standard of care; (3) that the plaintiff
suffered actual injury; and (4) that the physician's conduct caused the injury suffered. Mary
S. Newbold, Medical Malpractice Law: Pennsylvania's "Two Schools of Thought," 66 TEMP. L
REv. 613, 628 n.28 (1993).
25. Katherine Benesch, Managed Care Liability: An Expansion of Familiar Theories,
9(3) THE HEALTH LAWYER 8 (Spring 1997).
26. Borzi, supra note 2, at 136-37.
27. Id. Imputed agency, or ostensible agency, occurs when (1) a patient looks to the
institution (hospital or managed care organization) and not the individual physician for care;
and (2) the institution holds out the physician as its employee. McClellan v. Health
Maintenance Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053, 1057 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). With ostensible agency,
the physician is not an institution employee, but has arranged to care for patients at the
hospital or patients enrolled with the managed care organization. The Restatement (Second)
of Agency describes ostensible agency as: "One who represents that another is his servant or
other agency and thereby causes a third person justifiably to rely upon the care or skill of
such apparent agent is subject to liability to the third person for harm caused by the lack of
1998
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In addition to medical malpractice, courts are finding managed
care organizations liable for such non-tort causes of action as
breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty,28 breach of warranty,
and misrepresentation/false advertising. 29 Suits against MCOs have
originated due to complaints about their decisions and rules, such
as "the 24-hour-stay limitation for childbirths, breaches of patient
confidentiality in patient records, the delays and hassles involved in
obtaining specialist referrals," the availability, but non-use, of
high-tech and high-cost therapies,30 and negligent selection and
retention of physicians. 31 The conflicting goals of managed care
(the reduction of health care costs and the provision of quality




Many managed care plan participants have discovered that they
cannot pursue claims against their managed care organization
care or skill of the one appearing to be a servant or other agent as if he were such."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 267.
Actual agency, or respondeat superior, occurs when the master, or employer, becomes
liable for the torts of the servant, or employee. PROSSER AND KETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 69, at 499-500. In a managed care setting, respondeat superior applies when a physician is
directly employed by a managed care organization.
28. Borzi, supra note 2, at 136-37.
29. Diana Joseph Bearden & Bryan J. Maedgen, Emerging Theories of Liability in the
Managed Health Care Industry, 47 BAYLOR L REv. 285, 332-33 (1995).
30. Drake, supra note 10, at 562. A suit may be the result of the refusal of a managed
care organization to allow a patient to receive a high-tech or high-cost therapy in an effort to
keep the cost of care down.
31. Dorros, supra note 7, at 384. A managed care organization selects physicians to
treat its enrolled patients. Should a managed care organization fail to adequately screen a
physician, the managed care organization may be liable for negligent selection of that
physician. A managed care organization may fail to retain a physician who is treating
patients enrolled in its managed care plan. A patient may bring suit against a managed care
organization for negligent retention of physicians.
32. Marc A. Rodwin, Conflicts in Managed Care, 332(9) NEW ENG. J. MED. 604 (Mar. 2,
1995).
33. Nancy Shute, New Liabilities for Managed Care, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16,
1997, at 40.
Because ERISA only allows health plan participants to recover plan benefits or to
determine their rights under the employer's benefit plan, claimants injured by MCO
panel providers often have been left without an adequate remedy for damages where
courts have decided ERISA preempts their state law medical malpractice claims.
Injured parties have asserted that MCOs are either liable directly for negligent
provider supervision or selection or indirectly for the providers' actions as actual or
ostensible MCO agents.
Liability: DOL Opposes Malpractice Preemption for Plans; Lawmakers, AMA Take Interest,
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because ERISA often preempts those claims 4 Congress enacted
ERISA in 1974 "to protect participants in employee benefit plans
and their beneficiaries."35 The growth in size, scope, and number of
employee plans provided the impetus for the Act.36 ERISA requires
"the disclosure and reporting of financial and other information and
the establishment of standards of conduct for fiduciaries of
employee benefit plans."37  ERISA provides relief to plan
beneficiaries for ERISA violations in the federal court system.3 The
BNA HEATH CARE DAiLY, Apr. 4, 1997, at d2.
34. Bales, supra note 7, at 643. "Preemption" is a doctrine adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States that holds that federal laws with a national character preempt, or
take precedence, over state laws. A state may not enact a law which is inconsistent with
federal law. BLACK'S LAw DicnoNARY 1177 (6th ed. 1990).
35. Battaglia, supra note 11, at 205-206. See also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 90-91 (1983); Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 137 (1990). The Court was
concerned that workers close to retirement were losing their pensions. Additionally, the
Court found that pension plans were becoming more popular. Robert A- Cohen,
Understanding Preemption Removal under ERISA § 502, 72 N.Y.U. L REV. 578, 588 (1997).
"Thus, the central purpose of ERISA was to safeguard the benefit expectations of workers,
while encouraging the growth of pension plans. Prior to ERISA, there was only an ineffective
patchwork of state regulation covering this field; no federal remedy was available to workers
who felt that they had been unfairly deprived of the pensions." Id. at 589.
36. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a). The statute provides:
Congressional findings and declaration of policy.
(a) The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and numbers of
employee benefit plans in recent years has been rapid and substantial;. . . that
owing to the lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning
their operation, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their
beneficiaries, and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of
commerce, that disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to
the establishment, operation, and administration of such plans; ... that despite
the enormous growth in such plans many employees with long years of
employment are losing anticipated retirement benefits owing to the lack of
vesting provisions in such plans; that owing to the inadequacy of current
minimum standards, the soundness and stability of plans with respect to
adequate funds to pay promised benefits may be endangered; that owing to the
termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated, employees
and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated benefits .
Id.
37. Battaglia, supra note 11, at 205-206.
38. Id. 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132 provides:
Civil enforcement.
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary - -
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
[supply requested information]
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
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primary purpose of ERISA was to create a uniform national
regulatory scheme pertaining to employee benefit plans, replacing
conflicting state regulations.39 ERISA does not require employers to
provide any specific benefits, however.40
Pension plans and welfare plans are the two types of employee
benefit plans subject to ERISA.41 Pension plans provide income to
employees after retirement. 42  Welfare plans provide various
employee benefits, such as medical, health, accident, disability,
death, unemployment, paid vacation, training programs, day-care
services, scholarship funds, and legal services." ERISA covers
pension and welfare plans offered by employers to their




ERISA preempts state law that "relates to" an employee benefit
plan.46 However, laws that regulate insurance are exempt from
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or
(ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan; . . .
Id.
39. Battaglia, supra note 11, at 205-206. Many employers in the United States have
employees residing in multiple states. One national set of rules pertaining to employee
benefit plans will be easier for employers to adhere to and for employees to refer to.
40. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90-91 (1983). ERISA does not require an
employer to provide any particular type of benefit to its employees. However, if an employer
chooses to provide a benefit plan to its employees, ERISA then applies.
41. -Cohen, supra note 35, at 589. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002.
42. Id. Employers may establish a pension plan for employees in which either the
employer alone or the employer and employees pay into the fund. Upon retirement, the
employee receives monthly payments.
43. Id. Welfare plans provide employees with a variety of benefits. Some employers
provide employees with health coverage, such as enrollment in a managed care plan.
Insurance to cover accidents, disability, death, and unemployment may be provided to
employees. Additionally, paid vacations are a welfare plan benefit.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)(1).
45. Jack Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise
Liability, 22(1) Am. J. L & MED. 7, 9 (Nov. 1, 1996).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The statute provides:
Other laws.
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
1998 ERISA Preemption
ERISA preemption in the "savings clause" of the Act.47 "State law"
includes "all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State
action having the effect of law."48 If ERISA preempts a claim
against a managed care organization, it is likely that the plan
participant will be without redress because ERISA remedies have
been frequently interpreted to be limited to those provided by the
statute.49 Under ERISA, remedies are limited to the recovery of
benefits, enforcement of rights, or clarification of future benefits
under the plan. The statute does not specifically provide for
compensatory or punitive damages.50
Four categories of laws relate to an employee plan.51 The first
category consists of laws that regulate the types of benefits or
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any kind and all state
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
Id. (emphasis added).
47. Id. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) provides, in part:
(b) Construction and application
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subchapter shall
be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance, banking, or securities.
Id. The traditional three step analysis to determine if a state law is preempted by ERISA is:
(1) does the law "relate to" an employee benefit plan?; (2) if so, is the state law
.saved" from preemption under one of the specified exceptions to preemption (e.g.,
laws governing insurance, banking, security, generally applicable criminal laws, etc.)?;
(3) even if apparently saved under the insurance exception, does the state law violate
the "deemer" clause (i.e., is the state trying to circumvent preemption through the
insurance exception by "deeming" a plan to be an insurer)?
Borzi, supra note 2, at 148.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c). The statute provides:
(c) Definitions
For purposes of this section:
(1) The term "State law" includes all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other
State action having the effect of law, of any State. A law of the United States
applicable only to the District of Columbia shall be treated as a State law
rather than a-law of the United States.
(2) The term "State" includes a State, any political subdivisions thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by this
subchapter.
Id.
49. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 138-48 (1985).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B).
51. L. Frank Coan, Jr., You Can't Get There From Here - Questioning the Erosion of
ERISA Preemption in Medical Malpractice Actions Against HMOs, 30 GA L REv. 1023, 1049
(1996).
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terms of ERISA plans.52 The second category includes laws that
require ERISA plans to report, disclose, fund, or vest.- Laws that
provide parameters for the calculation of the quantity of benefits
comprise the third category.14 Finally, laws and common-law rules
that provide redress for misconduct arising from the administration
of the ERISA plan constitute the fourth category.
55
State courts, 'federal district courts, and federal circuit courts are
split concerning whether ERISA preempts negligence claims against
managed care organizations.56 Some courts have distinguished
negligence cases based upon failure to authorize treatment or
administration of the plan (usually preempted) from medical
malpractice claims against a physician (sometimes not
preempted).
57
COURT DECISIONS ADDRESSING ERISA PREEMPTION
Some state courts have held that ERISA does not preempt a
medical malpractice claim against a managed care organization.
Pennsylvania and Minnesota have allowed plaintiffs to proceed with
their medical malpractice suits.58 Other states, such as Texas and
California, have held that ERISA does preempt such a claim.59
Typically, defendant managed care organizations remove medical





56. Borzi, supra note 2, at 152. See also Harshbarger, supra note 2, at 192; Clifford,
supra note 4, at 8.
57. Clifford, supra note 4, at 8. See also Liability: DOL Opposes Malpractice
Preemption for Plans; Lawmakers, AMA Take Interest, BNA HEALTH CARE DAiLY, Apr. 4, 1997,
at d2.
58. Madsen v. Park Nicollet Med. Ctr., 419 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. 1988) (allowing a cause
of action for negligent nondisclosure of the physician compensation scheme); Boyd v. Albert
Einstein Medical Center, 547 A.2d 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (extending the theory of
ostensible agency liability to a managed care organization); McClellan v. Heath Maintenance
Org. of Pa., 604 A.2d 1053 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992), allocatur denied, 616 A.2d 985 (Pa. 1992)
(allowing a cause of action for improper physician selection); Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A-2d 711
(Pa Super. Ct. 1996) (allowing a medical malpractice action against a managed care
organization for negligent delay in authorizing the transfer of the plaintiff to another hospital
for specialized emergency care).
59. Williams v. Good Health Plans, Inc., 743 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1988) (holding that a
managed care organization is incapable of practicing medicine, so it cannot be held liable for
medical malpractice); Wickline v. California, 228 Cal. Rptr. 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding
that Medi-Cal, a state of California health plan, was not liable for harm caused by cost
containment program when patient discharged from hospital too soon).
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district courts, however, also have reached inconsistent decisions
regarding ERISA preemption of negligence claims against managed
care organizations.60 District courts in Connecticut, Mississippi,
Texas, New Jersey, and New York have determined that ERISA
preempts medical malpractice claims against managed care
organizations.61 Conversely, district courts in Pennsylvania and
Virginia have held that ERISA does not preempt such claims.
62
Like the district courts, circuit courts have also reached
conflicting decisions regarding ERISA preemption of medical
malpractice cases against managed care organizations. The Third
and Tenth Circuits have determined that ERISA does not preempt
malpractice claims against HMOs.6 The Seventh Circuit has
60. Cohen, supra note 35. "Removal," or "removal of causes," is the transferring of a
case from one court to another, such as from state to federal court. BiAci's LAw DIcTONARY
1295, 1296 (6th ed. 1990). Generally, a defendant can remove a case filed in state court to
federal court if the claim arises under federal law. Cohen, supra note 35, at 578. When
ERISA preemption is asserted by a defendant as a defense to a state law claim brought in
state court, the defendant may remove the case from state court to federal court Id.
61. See Altieri v. CIGNA Dental Health, Inc., 753 F Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990); Craft v.
Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 813 F Supp. 464 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Diaz v. Texas Health Enter., 822
F. Supp. 1258 (W.D. Texas 1993); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F. Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993); Butler
v. Wu, 853 F Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F Supp. 966
(S.D.N.Y. 1994).
62. Courts have held that medical malpractice claims against managed care
organization were not preempted by ERISA Independence HMO, Inc. v. Smith, 733 F Supp.
983 (E.D. Pa. 1990); Elsesser v. Hospital of the Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med.,
Parkview Div., 802 F Supp. 1286 (E.D. Pa 1992); Kearney v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 859 F
Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa 1994); Hoyt v. Edge, No. CIV. A. 97-3631, 1997 WL 356324 (E.D. Pa June
20, 1997); Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic States, Inc., 958 F Supp.
1137 (E.D. Va 1997).
63. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F3d 350, 353-54 (3d Cir. 1995). In Dukes, two
cases were consolidated. Id. at 351. The two plaintiffs (the estates of Dukes and Visconti)
brought medical malpractice actions in state court against HMOs organized by U.S.
Healthcare, Inc. Id. The defendant HMOs removed the cases to federal court, arguing that
ERISA preempted the claims. Id. The district court dismissed the claims, agreeing that
ERISA preempted. Id. The Third Circuit reversed. Dukes, 57 .3d at 352. The claim brought
by appellant estate of Dukes alleged that the HMO refused to perform blood studies of the
decedent who had an extremely high blood sugar level just before his death. Id at 352. The
claim brought by appellant estate of Visconti alleged malpractice in the care of her
pregnancy. Id. at 353. The Third Circuit held that a well-pleaded complaint alleging
negligence is not preempted by ERISA if it does not question a denial of benefits, but instead
challenges the quality of benefits received. Id. at 356.
Pacificare of Oklahoma v. Burrage, 59 F3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995). In Pacifware, the plaintiff
fied a malpractice action in state court against Pacificare of Oklahoma, Inc., an HMO.
Pacificare, 59 F3d at 152. The action was removed to federal court where the district court
held that ERISA preempted one of the claims and remanded the other two claims to the
state court. Id. Pacificare sought a writ of mandamus directing the district court judge to
rescind his order remanding the two claims to state court and to find them also preempted
by ERISA. Id. The Tenth Circuit denied the writ of mandamus. Id. at 155.
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.decided that ERISA preempts vicarious liability claims,6" but does
not preempt medical malpractice claims brought under the theory
of respondeat superior.65 The Fifth, Sixth and Eighth Circuits have
held, without qualification, that ERISA preempts medical
malpractice actions.
66
In an issue of first impression by a circuit court, the Tenth Circuit decided whether ERISA
preempts a claim that an HMO is vicariously liable for the alleged malpractice of one of its
physicians. Id. at 153. The district courts are divided on the issue. Id.
The Pacificare court explained that "ERISA does not preempt laws of general application
- not specifically targeting ERISA plans - that involve traditional areas of state regulation
and do not affect relations among the principal ERISA entities." Id. at 154. The Tenth Circuit
held that ERISA does not preempt a vicarious liability claim against an HMO, as it does not
preempt a malpractice claim against a doctor. Id. at 155.
64. Jass v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 88 F3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996). In Jass, the
plaintiff brought a medical malpractice claim against a managed care plan, alleging vicarious
liability for the medical practice of a physician who was not a managed care plan employee.
Id. at 1484. A claim was also brought against a nurse employed by the managed care plan.
Id. The Seventh Circuit held that the vicarious liability negligence claim was preempted by
ERISA Id. at 1485. The court explained that the vicarious liability claim "relates to" a benefit
plan. Id. at 1491. The Jass court characterized the negligence suit against PruCare as a
denial of benefits claim. Id. at 1490.
65. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995). Rice brought a medical malpractice
action against his physicians and his health plan administrator, the Prudential Insurance
Company of America, under the theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 638. The Seventh
Circuit found a factual issue as to whether the physician was an employee of the managed
care organization. Id. at 645. The Rice court held that no preemption of a medical
malpractice claim exists against a managed care organization under the theory of respondeat
superior. Id. at 646. The claim was not preempted because it did not rest on the terms of
the plaintiff's ERISA plan. Id. at 642.
66. Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
812 (1992); Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l
Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694
(1994).
In Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., the plaintiff was a member of a health plan funded
by her employer and administered by defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Alabama.
Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F2d 1321, 1322-23 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
812 (1992). The plan, Medical Assistance Plan ("MAP"), refused to allow the plaintiff to be
hospitalized for the final months of her pregnancy, and the unborn child died. Id. Under a
portion of the Plan, "Quality Care Program" ("QCP"), participants of the plan had to obtain
advance approval for hospital admissions and specified medical procedures. Id. at 1323.
Continued approval had to be obtained for a hospitalized participant. Id. QCP, administered
by defendant United HealthCare, was a form of cost-containment known as "utilization
review," in which evaluations of care were made using established clinical criteria. Id..
Mrs. Corcoran and her husband, the plaintiffs, brought a wrongful death action in
Louisiana state court, alleging that the death of their unborn child was the result of the
negligence of Blue Cross and United HealthCare. Additionally, Mrs. Corcoran alleged
aggravation of a pre-existing depressive condition and Mr. Corcoran sought damages for loss
of consortium. Id. at 1324.
The defendants removed the case to federal court. Id. The district court granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that ERISA preempted the claims. Id. at
1325. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that ERISA preempted the medical malpractice
1998 ERISA Preemption
The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet decided a
case concerning the medical malpractice of a managed care
organization. Other ERISA cases, however, provide guidance for
predicting how the Supreme Court may rule. In Shaw v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., airlines and other employers sought a declaratory
judgment that ERISA preempted New York's Human Rights law and
disability benefit statutes.67 The laws prohibited discrimination in
employment, including discrimination on the basis of pregnancy in
employee benefit plans.6 The Supreme Court held that ERISA
preempted the New York Human Rights law only insofar as it
prohibited practices that were lawful under federal law. The Court
further held that ERISA did not preempt the disability benefits law,
although New York could not enforce its provisions through
regulation of ERISA-covered benefit plans.
69
In describing preemption by ERISA, the Court held that "[s]ome
state actions may affect employee benefit plans in too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral a manner to warrant a finding that the law
'relates to' the plan."70 However, many District and Circuit Courts
determined after Shaw that medical malpractice claims were not
claims. Id. at 1322. The circuit court concluded that while United HealthCare gave medical
advice, it was in the context of awarding benefits. Id. at 1331.
In Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., the Sixth Circuit held that malpractice claims based
on negligent or improper decision making relating to a plan participant's eligibility for
benefits was preempted by ERISA. Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F.3d 937, 944 (6th
Cir. 1995).
In Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., plaintiff Buddy Kuhl was a
member through his employer of Lincoln National, an HMO which paid independent
physicians, hospitals, and other health care providers to furnish medical services to its
members. Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc., 999 F2d 298, 299-300 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 694 (1994). Lincoln National refused to allow Mr. Kuhl to
undergo surgery at a particular hospital because it was outside its service area. Id. at 300.
The delay in having the surgery performed resulted in so much further deterioration of Mr.
Kuhl's heart that surgery was no longer an option. Id. Mr. Kuhl died waiting for a heart
transplant. Id.
The plaintiffs, Mr. Kuhl's surviving family, brought suit in Missouri state court against
Lincoln National, alleging medical malpractice, emotional distress, tortious interference with
Mr. Kuhl's right to contract for medical care, and breach of contract. Id.. The defendant had
the case removed to federal district court where summary judgment was granted in favor of
the defendant on the ground that the claims were preempted by ERISA. Id. at 300-301. The
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the claims were based on the delay in
providing Mr. Kuhl with heart surgery, thus "related" to the plan. Id. at 303.
67. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 108-09 (1983).
68. Id.
69. Id. New York could not require an employer to amend its ERISA plan to comply
with the law, however, New York could compel an employer to maintain a separate plan if
necessary (for instance to provide pregnant employees with adequate disability benefits). Id.
70. Id. at 100 n.21.
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"too tenuous, remote, or peripheral" to escape preemption by
ERISA.
71
. In Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, the Supreme Court held that
ERISA preempts state common-law tort and contract actions,
asserting improper processing of a claim for benefits under an
insured employee benefit plan.7 2 The Court declared that the
"question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal
law is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the
ultimate touchstone."73 In favor of preemption, one could argue that
Congress intended to create one uniform set of laws affecting
benefit plans. 74 However, in opposition to preemption, one could
argue that Congress enacted ERISA to benefit employees, not to
take remedies away for common-law torts.
The divergent views among state and federal courts regarding
71. See Altieri v. CIGNA Dental Health, Inc., 753 F Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990); Craft v.
Northbrook Life Ins. Co., 813 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Miss. 1993); Diaz v. Texas Health Enter., 822
F. Supp. 1258 (W.D. Texas 1993); Ricci v. Gooberman, 840 F Supp. 316 (D. N.J. 1993); Butler
v. Wu, 853 F. Supp. 125 (D. N.J. 1994); Nealy v. U.S. Healthcare HMO, 844 F. Supp. 966
(S.D.N.Y. 1994). See also Perkins v. Time Ins. Co., 898 E2d 470 (5th Cir. 1990); Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992);
Tolton v. American Biodyne, Inc., 48 F3d 937 (6th Cir. 1995); Jass v. Prudential Health Care
Plan, Inc., 88 E3d 1482 (7th Cir. 1996); Kuhl v. Lincoln Nat'l Health Plan of Kansas City, Inc.,
999 F.2d 298 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1045 (1994).
72. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 43-44 (1987). In Pilot Life, the plaintiff,
Everate Dedeaux, injured his back in an employee related accident. Dedeaux was covered by
a long term disability employee benefit plan backed by a group insurance policy from Pilot
Life Insurance Company ("Pilot Life"). After two years, Pilot Life terminated Dedeaux's
benefits. During the next three years, Dedeaux's benefits were reinstated and terminated
several times. Dedeaux brought a diversity action in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi against Pilot Life, alleging tortious breach of contract, breach
of fiduciary duties, and fraud in the inducement. The district court granted Pilot Life's
motion for summary judgment The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. Id. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that ERISA preempts a state law claim
which asserts improper processing of a claim for benefits under an ERISA regulated plan
and is not "saved" by the "savings" clause that excepts state laws that regulate insurance
from preemption (29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)). Id. at 57.
73. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 45. See also Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133,
137-38 (1990). Recently, in De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. and Clinical Serv. Fund, 117S. Ct.
1747, 1752 (1997), the Supreme Court reiterated that the objectives of Congress in
enacting ERISA should be used as a "guide" in evaluating preemption of state law. Many
are questioning whether ERISA was intended to be so broadly interpreted. Louise Kertesz,
High Court Upholds HMO Suit Dismissal, MODERN HEALTHCARE, May 22, 1995, at 26.
74. One argument in favor of preemption is that managed care organizations would
face financial ruin if medical malpractice liability were applied. Laura H. Harshbarger, ERISA
Preemption Meets the Age of Managed Care: Toward a Comprehensive Social Policy, 47
SYRACUSE L REV. 191, 222 (1996). However, "many HMOs often have in excess of $1 billion
dollars in liquid assets, and it is not uncommon for even nidsize HMOs to have $500 million
in cash reserves." Id.
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ERISA preemption is largely attributable to their interpretations of
the phrase "relate to." The Supreme Court explained that the words
"relate to" were given a "broad common-sense meaning, such that a
state law 'relates to' a benefit plan in the normal sense of the
phrase, if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan."
75
The Pilot Life Court clarified that the "preemption clause is not
limited to state laws specifically designed to affect employee
benefit plans."76 Arguably, a medical malpractice claim does not
"relate to" a benefit plan in the "normal sense of the phrase."
In Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., the Supreme
Court held that ERISA does not preempt "run-of-the-mill state-law
claims."7 7 The Court listed examples of state law claims that ERISA
would not preempt: "unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even
torts committed by an ERISA plan."78 Certainly, one could argue
that medical malpractice is a "run-of-the-mill state-law claim" and,
therefore, should not be preempted by ERISA. However, even after
Mackey, many circuit courts continued to hold that ERISA
preempts a medical malpractice claim against a managed care
organization.7 9
Seven years after deciding Mackey, the Supreme Court presented
a stronger pronouncement that medical malpractice claims against
ERISA-covered managed care organizations may not be preempted
by ERISA.80 The Court in New York State Conference of Blue Cross
& Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co. held that all laws with
indirect economic effects on ERISA plans may not be preempted
by ERISA.81 The Court questioned whether all state law could be
75. Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 47.
76. Id.
77. Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 833 (1988). Mackey
involved ERISA preemption of Georgia statutes which provided for the garnishment of funds
from ERISA employee welfare benefit plans. Id. at 827. The Court held that ERISA preempts
the Georgia statute which singles out ERISA employee welfare benefit plans for different
treatment under state garnishment procedures. Id. at 830. Additionally, the Court found that
ERISA does not forbid garnishment of an ERISA welfare benefit plan. Id. at 841.
78. Id. at 833. The Mackey court did not define "run-of-the-mill state-law claims," but
simply provided these examples.
79. See note 71 and accompanying text.
80. New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995). In New York State Conference, several commercial insurers
acting as fiduciaries of ERISA plans joined with their trade associations to bring suit against
state officials to invalidate a New York statute. Id. The statute required hospitals to collect
surcharges from patients covered by a commercial insurer, but not from patients insured by
a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan. The Supreme Court held that the statutes were not preempted
by ERISA. Id. at 1673-74.
81. Id. at 1681.
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interpreted as relating to an employee benefit plan, such that all
causes of action could be preempted; certainly Congress intended
no such result.82
The American Medical Association 3 and the United States
Department of Labor have filed amicus briefs in medical
malpractice cases urging the courts to find that such cases are not
preempted by ERISA.84 The American Medical Association asserts
that ERISA preemption is unfair to both health care providers and
their patients.85
FIDUCIARY LIABILITY
ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on plan administrators.8
82. Id. at 1677. The Court reasoned:
The governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive. Section 514(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)]
marks for pre-emption "all state laws insofar as they relate to any employee benefit
plan" covered by ERISA, and one might be excused for wondering, at first blush,
whether the words of limitation ("insofar as they relate") do much limiting. If "relate
to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then for all
practical purposes pre-emption would never run its course, for really, universally,
relations stop nowhere.. . . But that, of course, would be to read Congress's words of
limitation as mere sham, and to read the presumption against preemption out of the
law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generality.
Id. In United Wire v. Morristoum Mem'l Hosp., 995 F2d 1179, 1193 (3d Cir. 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 944 (1993), the Third Circuit explained that if ERISA were interpreted to
preempt all claims that affect a managed care organization, these companies would enjoya
unique status in the law. Id.
83. Liability: Court Set to Hear Oral Arguments on ERISA Preemption in Injury Suit,
BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 30, 1997, at d3. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was
scheduled to hear oral arguments in Pappas v. Asbel, 675 A.2d 711 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), to
determine if a health plan can use ERISA to protect itself from a personal injury suit. Id. See
also Liability: DOL Opposes Malpractice Preemption for Plans; Lawmakers, AMA Take
Interest, BNA HEALTH CARE DAILY, Apr. 4, 1997, at d2.
84. Liability: DOL Opposes, supra note 83, at d2. The United States Department of
Labor filed amicus briefs in eight cases, contending that ERISA does not preempt
malpractice laws because these laws do not mandate benefit plan structure or
administration. Professional Liability: Benefit Plan Law Does Not Supersede Claims of
Medical Malpractice by HMO, BNA HEALTH CARE DAiLY, Nov. 5, 1997, at d3.
85. Liability: Court Set, supra note 83, at d3. A member of the AMA Board of Trustees
said:
It is a sad and disturbing irony that ERISA, the very law Congress enacted in 1974 to
ensure that employees receive appropriate benefits, is now being subverted to shield
health plans from liability when their decisions to deny care or to provide inadequate
care result in patient ijury. ... Because of ERISA preemption, state courts are
unable to hear personal injury suits against health plans, and patients are not able to
seek redress for wrongful medical determinations made by plans.
Id.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 1104. The statute provides:
A fiduciary is a person who has power over the affairs of another party and who is
1998 ERISA Preemption
Fiduciaries may be held liable to plan participants, or managed
care enrollees, "for coverage determinations, treatment decisions,
selection and monitoring of members of the provider network, and
possibly, even for potential medical malpractice."
87
The Supreme Court described ERISA's fiduciary duty
requirements in Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc.88 Under ERISA, fiduciary
duties and responsibilities include "the proper management,
administration, and investment of [plan] assets, the maintenance of
proper records, the disclosure of specified information, and the
avoidance of conflicts of interest."89 ERISA provides remedies for
breach of these fiduciary duties.90 A plan beneficiary (enrollee) may
bring a civil suit to: (1) enjoin any act or practice that violates any
provision of ERISA or the terms of the plan; (2) obtain other
appropriate equitable relief to redress such violations or to enforce
any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan.91
required by law to act on that person's behalf. The law holds fiduciaries to the highest
standards of conduct. Fiduciaries are expected to be loyal to those for whom they act,
and in exercising discretion and independent judgment, to act for their exclusive
benefit. The law explicitly defines some relations as fiduciary, including the
trustee-beneficiary relation, the lawyer-client relation, the corporate
officer-shareholder relation, relations among partners, and the public servant in
relation to the public. The law has held that physicians, nurses, and medical care
institutions are fiduciaries for patients, but only in limited contexts.
Rodwin, supra note 32, at 604.
87. Borzi, supra note 2, at 136.
88. Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993). In Mertens, the Supreme Court held
that a nonfiduciary who knowingly participates in the breach of fiduciary duty imposed by
ERISA is not liable for losses that an employee benefit plan suffers as a result of the breach.
Id. at 262-63.
89. Id. at 251-52.
90. Id, at 252. The Court explained:
Section 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a), makes fiduciaries liable for breach of these duties,
and specifies the remedies available against them: The fiduciary is personally liable
for damages (to make good to the plan any losses to the plan resulting from each
such breach), for restitution (to restore to the plan any profits of such fiduciary which
have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary), and for such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including
removal of the fiduciary.
Id.
91. Id. at 262-63. Title 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) permits plan participants to bring civil
actions to obtain "appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of the statute or the
plan. The statute provides:
Civil enforcement
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought -
(1) by a participant or beneficiary -
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of this section, or
[supply requested information]
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The fiduciary duties created by ERISA may be the basis for
recovery by a plaintiff for the medical malpractice of a managed
care organization. In Shea v. Esensten, the Eighth Circuit created a
new avenue for obtaining relief, despite its holding that ERISA
preempted the plaintiff's claims for wrongful death. 92 The Court
validated the plaintiff's claim that the defendant managed care
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his plan, to
enforce his rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights to
future benefits under the terms of the plan;
(2) by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary or fiduciary for appropriate
relief under section 1109 of this title;
(3) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary
(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan, or
(B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this
subchapter or the terms of the plan; ....
(g) Attorney's fees and cost; awards in actions involving delinquent contributions
(1) In any action under this subchapter (other than an action described in
paragraph (2)) by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either
party ....
(1) Civil penalties on violations by fiduciaries
(1) In the case of -
(A) any breach of fiduciary responsibility under (or other violation of)
part 4 by fiduciary, or
(B) any knowing participation in such a breach or violation by any other
person, the Secretary shall assess a civil penalty against such fiduciary
or other person in an am6unt equal to 20 percent of the applicable
recovery amount.
(3) The Secretary may, in the Secretary's sole discretion, waive or reduce the
penalty under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines in writing that -
(A) the fiduciary or other person acted reasonably and in good faith, or
(B) it is reasonable to expect that the fiduciary or other person will not
be able to restore all losses to the plan (or to provide the relief ordered
pursuant to subsection (a)(9) of this section) without severe financial
hardship unless such waiver or reduction is granted.
Id.
92. Shea v. Esensten, 107 F3d 625, 627 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 297
(1997). Patrick Shea was a member of the Medica health maintenance organization. At age
40, Mr. Shea had symptoms and a family history of heart disease. He was suffering chest
pains, shortness of breath, muscle tingling, and dizziness. Medica's procedures required a
written referral from the assigned primary care physician before a patient could consult a
specialist. Mr. Shea's doctor told him that a referral to a cardiologist was unnecessary. Mr.
Shea was unaware that Medica provided financial incentives to primary care physicians to
minimize referrals to specialists, docking a portion of their fees if they made too many.
When Mr. Shea offered to pay for the cardiologist's services himself, he was told that he was
too young and did not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a cardiologist. Mr. Shea did
not consult a cardiologist and died of heart failure a few months after first reporting the
symptoms to his primary care doctor. Id. at 626.
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organization violated its fiduciary duties under ERISA by
attempting to reduce covered referrals and not disclosing to her
and her deceased husband that his physician was offered financial
incentives not to make specialist referrals.93 The circuit court
reversed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint.94
One month after Shea was decided, the United States District
Court for the District of New Hampshire, in Drolet v. Healthsource,
Inc., held that the plaintiff, in her class action complaint, stated a
valid cause of action when she alleged that Healthsource New
Hampshire, a managed care organization, breached its fiduciary
duty in misrepresenting the nature of the relationship between the
company and its contracting physicians.95 In Drolet, no medical
malpractice was alleged, however, a new theory of fiduciary
liability of a managed care organization was asserted.96 The district
court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss.
9 7
Three months after Drolet, the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, in Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., also held
that the plaintiff, in a class action suit, stated a cause of action for
breach of the defendant's fiduciary duty.98 The court explained that
93. Id. The Shea court held that the duty of a fiduciary to disclose material information
is "the core of a fiduciary's responsibility." Id. at 628-29. The court further explained that Mr.
Shea had the right to know of the financial incentives that "could have colored his doctor's
medical judgment about the urgency for a cardiac referral.. . . Health care decisions involve
matters of life and death, and an ERISA fiduciary has a duty to speak out if it knows that
silence might be harmful." Id.
94. Id. at 629.
95. Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F Supp. 757, 757-58 (D.N.H. 1997). Robin Drolet, a
beneficiary of a health care plan administered by the Mitre Corporation which contracted
with Healthsource New Hampshire to provide the health care coverage, alleged that
Healthsource made several false and misleading statements to plan beneficiaries. In the
"Group Subscriber Agreement" issued by Healthsource, it explained that "the physician has a
contractual relationship with Healthsource which does not interfere with the exercise of the
physician's independent medical judgment." Id. at 758. Drolet contended that the
doctor-patient relationship was actually compromised by several undisclosed financial
incentives which cause physicians to reduce specialty referrals, including the "Referral Fund"
which allows a physician to earn up to one-third more income by minimizing the "use of
specialty services such as diagnostic tests, referrals, and hospitalizations." Id.
96. Id. The plaintiff sought a declaration that Healthsource had breached its fiduciary
duties under ERISA, an injunction preventing further dissemination of materials containing
the misrepresentations or omissions, an injunction preventing Healthsource from
implementing or enforcing the provisions of its physician contracts, a return of premiums
paid, and attorneys' fees and costs. Id.
97. Id. at 762.
98. Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Michelle Weiss was a participant in a health plan offered by her employer and managed by
Cigna Healthcare of New York, a managed care organization. Weiss alleged that Cigna had
breached the express and implied terms of the plan and various fiduciary duties required by
1998
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"ERISA requires plan fiduciaries to discharge their duties with
respect to a plan solely in the interest of the participants and
beneficiaries."99 The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's claim of breach of fiduciary duty arising from Cigna
Healthcare's "gag order" policy.
100
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether a plan
beneficiary (or managed care enrollee) who brings suit for breach
of fiduciary duty is limited to damages for the benefit not provided,
or may recover compensatory damages. 10 In Mertens v. Hewitt
Assoc., the Supreme Court held that the relief described in ERISA
section 502(a)(3) (codified at 29 U.S.C.A. § 1132(a)(3)) as "other
appropriate equitable relief" is the type of relief typically available
in equity ("injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not
compensatory damages").
102
In Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, the Supreme
Court held that a fiduciary of an employee benefit plan could not
be held personally liable to a plan beneficiary for extra-contractual
compensatory or punitive damages caused by improper or untimely
processing of benefits claims.03 Two years later, the Court, in Pilot
Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, found evidence that Congress did not
authorize remedies other than those specifically listed in ERISA.'
04
In Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., the Supreme Court held that
ERISA. Id. Weiss contended that Cigna had "an undisclosed policy" of "preventing its
physicians from advising patients of treatment options which are not compensable by the
HMO, and that it enforces this gag-order policy by reprimanding or even terminating
physicians who disclose that Cigna will not cover particular forms of treatment that might be
useful to the patient." Id. The Court held that Weiss' claim for breach of express and implied
terms of the plan was preempted by ERISA, even though the claim for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA stated a valid claim. Id. However, the Court also held that Cigna did not
have an affirmative obligation to inform plan participants about the financial arrangements
with participating physicians. Id. at 755.
99. Id. at 751.
100. Id. at 756.
101. See Karl J. Stoecker, ERISA Remedies After Varity Corp. v. Howe, 9 DEPAUL Bus.
L J. 237 (1997). The compensatory damages may include: actual loss, pain and suffering,
emotional distress, deprivation of future earnings. It is uncertain whether punitive damages
will be available.
102. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257. See also Stoecker, supra note 101, at 246.
103. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 (1985). In
Massachusetts Mut. Life, a beneficiary of an employee benefit plan brought action to recover
damages, inter alia, for improper processing of her claim for disability benefits. Id.
104. Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987). "The six carefully integrated
civil enforcement provisions found in § 502(a) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)] of the statute as finally
enacted provide strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies
that it simply forgot to incorporate expressly." Id.
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compensatory damages were not available under ERISA.1°5
However, three years after Mertens, in Varity Corp. v. Howe, the
Court entertained the possibility of compensatory damages under
ERISA, holding that ERISA authorized suits for individualized
equitable relief.' 6 The Court held that Congress provided remedies
for breaches of fiduciaries other than the interpretation of plan
documents and the payment of claims. 10 7 The Varity Court
explained that the purposes of ERISA indicate that individual
beneficiaries should have a remedy under ERISA. 08
The Supreme Court, in Varity, further provided that courts
should determine the meaning of "appropriate equitable relief" by
keeping "in mind" the "special nature and purpose of employee
benefit plans" and the relief available elsewhere in ERISA. 1°9 ERISA
specifically provides that a plan beneficiary"0 may recover benefits
and may enjoin an act or practice that violates ERISA."'
Compensatory damages for harm other than those just mentioned
(such as medical malpractice) may then be provided under 29
U.S.C. section 1132 (A)(3) to "obtain other appropriate equitable
relief."
In Shea v. Esensten, the Eight Circuit "declined" to discuss
remedies for the plaintiff because they were not part of the district
court's ruling.1 2 In Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., the district court
held that Drolet could sue to enjoin Healthsource from making the
allegedly false and misleading statements." 3 However, the Drolet
105. Mertens, 508 U.S. at 257.
106. Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1079 (1996). In Varity, beneficiaries of a
firm's employee welfare benefit plan brought suit against their plan administrator (their
employer), claiming that the plan administrator fraudulently induced them to withdraw from
the plan and forfeit their benefits. Id. at 1068.
107. Id. at 1077. The Court stated, "ERISA specifically provides a remedy for breaches
of fiduciary duty with respect to the interpretation of plan documents and the payment of
claims .... Why should we not conclude that Congress provided yet other remedies for yet
other breaches of other sorts of fiduciary obligation in another, 'catchall' remedial section?"
Id.
108. Id. at 1078. The Court explained, "ERISA's basic purposes favor a reading of the
third subsection that provides the plaintiffs with a remedy [29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)]. The
statute itself says that it seeks "to protect . . . the interests of participants . . . and . . .
beneficiaries . . . by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for
fiduciaries . . . and . . . providing for appropriate remedies . . . and ready access to the
Federal courts." Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1078.
109. Varity, 116 S. Ct. at 1079.
110. 29 U.S.C. § 1132 (a)(1)(B).
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3).
112. Shea, 107 F3d at 629.
113. Drolet, 968 F Supp. at 760. The plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaration that
Healthsource breached its fiduciary duties under ERISA; (2) a declaration that Healthsource
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court explained that the plaintiff was not entitled to relief because
the plaintiff failed to claim that the alleged false and misleading
statements caused any harm. 14  Although courts are now
considering breach of fiduciary claims under ERISA, the extent of
available damages is still unsettled.
AMEND ERISA
Injured enrollees of managed care organizations will be offered
an adequate remedy if Congress amends ERISA to clearly declare
that state law claims of medical malpractice against managed care
organizations are not preempted."5 Alternatively, Congress could
amend ERISA to conclusively provide damages for breaches of
fiduciary duty. Members of Congress have expressed interest in
amending ERISA to allow such suits. 16 The Senate strategy
proposes a comprehensive plan to regulate managed care and
violated the express and implied terms of the plan; (3) an injunction preventing further
dissemination by Healthsource of materials containing misrepresentations or omissions; (4)
an injunction preventing Healthsource from implementing or enforcing the provisions of its
contracts with participating physicians; (5) a return of the fair value of premiums paid to
Healthsource; and (6) attorneys' fees and costs. Id. at 758. In Weiss v. Cigna Healthcare,
Inc., the plaintiffs did not seek compensatory damages, only declaratory and injunctive relief.
Weiss, 972 F Supp. at 750.
114. Drolet, 968 F Supp. at 760. Retrospective relief is not available under ERISA. Id.
115. Kilcullen, supra note 45, at 7. The Court found:
The obstacle posed by ERISA can be effectively removed by amending it to allow
recovery for injuries shown to result from the provision or withholding of medical
treatment. Patients should not be required to show individual negligence of specific
parties. Rather, they should rely on the strict liability of the enterprise as the basis of
recovery on a factual showing of a causal relationship between the action or inaction
of the plan and the injuries they suffered.
Id. at 49. See also Shute, supra note 33.
116. Liability: DOL Opposes, supra note 83. "Rep. Charles Norwood (R-Ga) has said
he intends to introduce legislation later this month clarifying that health plans may be sued
for medical malpractice under state law." Id.
The Senate has also had proposals to Amend ERISA. "Two recent legislative proposals to
establish federal minimum standards for fair and reasonable health plan procedures are the
Patient Protection Act of 1997 (S. 346), introduced on Feb. 24, 1997 by Sen. Paul Wellstone
(D-Minn) and the Health Insurance Bill of Rights of 1997 (S. 373), introduced on Feb. 25,
1997 by Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.). Both bills have been referred to the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources." Id.
Most recently, Democratic leaders in the House and Senate announced legislation for a
Patient Bill of Rights on March 31, 1998. The bills (S. 1890 and H.R. 3605) are based on an
earlier proposal made by Sen. Edward Kennedy and Rep. John Dingell. Among numerous
provisions, the bill allows the decision of whether a plan enrollee can bring suit against a
managed care plan to be determined by state law, specifically overriding ERISA preemption.
Democrats Introduce Patient Bill of Rights, 9(13) WAsu. HIGHUGHTS 2-3 (Apr. 2, 1998).
ERISA Preemption
protect the rights of patients."7
Finally, injured enrollees' rights will be adequately protected if
the Supreme Court decides the issue and finds that ERISA does not
preempt medical malpractice actions against managed care
organizations.
CONCLUSION
As managed care organizations continue to enroll more patients,
their control over the provision of medical care correspondingly
increases. Managed care enrollees who have been harmed by the
medical malpractice of their managed care organizations have often
been denied the right to recover damages. Congress enacted ERISA
to aid plan participants but has actually become a substantial
impediment to their recovery for injuries. The most expeditious and
lucid remedy would be for Congress to amend ERISA to clearly
provide that the medical malpractice of managed care organizations
will not be shielded by ERISA. Certainly, Congress did not intend
the preemption of these claims by ERISA. Even assuming that
Congress intended preemption, leaving employees without a
remedy clearly contradicts the spirit of ERISA. Congress enacted
ERISA to provide protection for employee benefit programs.
Unbelievably, that very legislation has often impeded recovery of
damages in egregious situations.
State legislatures have recently enacted legislation to address
liability of managed care organizations.118 However, courts may also
find that ERISA preempts these laws. The rapidly changing
American health care arena has created an urgent need for either
Congress or the Supreme Court to mandate that ERISA does not
preempt a medical malpractice claim brought by an enrollee against
a managed care organization.
Julie K Freeman
117. Robert Pear, Congress Weighs More Regulation on Managed Care, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar.
10, 1997, § A, at 6. "H.M.O.'s have great potential to expand access to care and control costs,
Mr. Kennedy said, but 'in too many cases, the priority has become higher profits, not better
health.'" Id. If H.M.O.s block comprehensive federal regulation, piecemeal legislation will
likely be passed. Id.
118. Liability: DOL Opposes . .. , supra note 83. "Despite ERISAis restrictions, state
legislatures have begun to look at regulating health plans more aggressively, and some of the
proposed state laws do address health plan liability for patient injury stemming from actions
by plan personnel and affiliated providers." Id.
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